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In March 2018, news of the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal made headlines around 
the world.  By inappropriately collecting data from approximately 87 million users’ Facebook 
profiles, the data analytics company, Cambridge Analytica, created psychographically 
tailored advertisements that allegedly aimed to influence people’s voting preferences in the 
2016 US presidential election.  In the aftermath of this incident, we conducted a series of 
semi-structured interviews with 30 participants based at a UK university, discussing their 
understanding of online privacy and how they manage it in the wake of the scandal.  We 
analysed this data using an inductive (i.e. ‘bottom-up’) thematic analysis approach.  Contrary 
to many opinions reported in the news, the respondents in our sample did not delete their 
accounts, frantically change their privacy settings, or even express that much concern.  As a 
result, individuals often consider themselves immune to psychographically tailored 
advertisements, and lack understanding of how automated approaches and algorithms work in 
relation to their (and their networks’) personal data.  We discuss our findings in relation to 
wider related research (e.g. crisis fatigue, networked privacy, Protection Motivation Theory) 
and discuss directions for future research.   
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As society becomes increasingly digitized, individuals and organisations face 
incessant challenges when it comes to protecting data and mitigating against security threats.  
In the first half of 2019 for instance, 3,800 data breaches were reported to have occurred 
globally, compromising 4.1 billion data records (Winder, 2019).  With cyberattacks and data 
leakages occurring across all sectors, (from health care to finance, and retail to government 
etc. Magee, 2018) it is unsurprising that such incidents are reported so frequently in the news.  
The Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal was amongst one of the most heavily publicised 
data breaches of 2018 – following the revelation that around 87 million individuals’ data 
were illicitly harvested without their consent (Cadwalladr, 2018; Kitchgaessner, 2018).  
Moreover, this data was then used to create psychographically tailored advertisements that 
allegedly aimed to influence people’s voting preferences in the 2016 US presidential election 
(Kitchgaessner, 2018).  The scale of the data-misuse, combined with such grand claims of 
mass-manipulation provoked global outrage and stimulated numerous protests calling for 
people to delete their accounts (e.g. ‘#DeleteFacebook’, and ‘#Faceblock’ (Slawson, 2018; 
Timms & Heimans, 2018).   
 The scandal also sparked debates about the ethical standards of individuals’ privacy 
online, alongside demands for artificial intelligence to be regulated (e.g. Hern, 2018).  
However, despite the outcry and widespread appeal for change, implementing these 
standards, or merely deleting accounts is not so straightforward.  For instance, previous 
research has highlighted that individuals are reluctant to respond to (seemingly) endless data 
breaches (Choi, Park, & Jung, 2018), and often display behaviour that appears to conflict 
with their concerns (e.g.  Barnes, 2006; Norberg, Horne, & Horne, 2007).  Research has also 
shown that individuals are often unaware that the information on their newsfeeds is curated in 
line with their preferences and viewpoints (Eslami et al., 2015; Hern, 2017).  This would also 
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suggest that they are unaware that fake news, filter bubbles, and targeted advertisements 
could supposedly influence their opinions or political preferences.  To our knowledge, the 
link between how people perceive their privacy in relation to this particular form of targeted 
advertising (and the persuasive effects thereof) is not well understood, thus this research 
attempts to explore this area.   More specifically, it seeks to understand: 1) how concerned 
people feel about their privacy online, 2) how they protect themselves, and 3) whether they 
pro-actively manage content (i.e. block, delete, report) that they disagree with, or do not wish 
to see.   
We conducted an exploratory study that investigated people’s perspectives on these 
issues in April/May 2018, directly after the Cambridge Analytica scandal was reported in the 
media.  Through a series of semi-structured interviews, we asked three overarching questions 
with respect to Facebook: 1) What is your understanding of online privacy? 2) How do you 
protect yourself in this online context? and 3) How do you avoid unwanted content?  In 
particular, we also aimed to explore whether participants highlighted the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal within these discussions, and if so, how this affected their outlook and use 
of Facebook.  Figure 1. depicts a timeline of events related to the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal in relation to when our study was conducted.  In the following sections, we provide 
an overview of how Cambridge Analytica collected and profiled personal data, before 
discussing related concepts and theoretical models that have been applied to the study of 
online privacy and targeted advertising.   
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
1.1. Privacy and Targeted Advertising 
 Understanding online privacy is a challenging and complex matter.  Users are 
typically required to disclose personal information in order to use online services, and the 
settings that protect/restrict access to these services change frequently.  This can be 
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particularly confusing when using social media, because individuals must continually reveal 
information about themselves in order to interact with others.  Over the last few years, 
research has demonstrated that privacy is not restricted to a platform’s settings or the content 
individuals choose to publish online (e.g. Kosinski, Stillwell, & Graepel, 2013; Youyou, 
Kosinski, & Stillwell, 2015).  Rather, a person’s patterns of behaviour (such as their language 
patterns, number of friends, frequency of logins) can reveal certain demographic attributes or 
personality traits when analysed by computer algorithms.  The opportunity to study human 
behaviour in this way has provoked much research seeking to predict how accurately 
personal information can be predicted from a person’s digital footprints (e.g. Hinds & 
Joinson, 2018; Hinds & Joinson, 2019).  
 If digital footprints are accurate reflections of a person’s identity and behaviour, then 
such analytics become lucrative methods that organisations can use to create targeted 
advertisements that align with people’s personal preferences.  Indeed, research in both 
marketing and psychology has reported that advertisements psychologically tailored towards 
individuals’ socio-demographics and preferences are more effective than non-tailored 
advertisements (Hirsh, Kang, & Bodenhausen, 2012; Matz, Kosinski, Nave, & Stillwell, 
2017; Moon, 2002).  It is the combination of using digital traces to subsequently influence 
behaviour that was the premise of Cambridge Analytica’s business model (i.e. their claims to 
“use data to change audience behaviour” (“Cambridge Analytica,” 2018)).  Further, what 
made such activities possible was largely due to Facebook’s privacy policies at the time 
Cambridge Analytica collected people’s data.  The personality quiz, ‘This Is Your Digital 
Life’ was an application that asked respondents to share their data in exchange for the results 
of the personality test.  What respondents did not realise however, was that agreeing to share 
their data also granted the app permission to collect data from their entire network as well 
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(Hern, 2018b).  Hence, for the 270,000 individuals who provided access to their data, there 
were millions who did not (Hern, 2018b).    
Although the true effectiveness of Cambridge Analytica’s targeted advertisements are 
unknown, the notion that they could influence voting preferences has been highly criticised 
by both social scientists and politicians (e.g. Chen & Potenza, 2018; Trump, 2018)).  One 
such reason is that personality questionnaires are highly limited because individuals may 
have distorted perceptions of their characteristics, or they may misrepresent themselves when 
answering questions (Stone, Bachrach, Jobe, Kurtzman & Cain, 1999).  This would mean that 
advertisements tailored towards individuals’ attributes would not be particularly accurate or 
well matched to their traits.  Another reason is that the data harvested by the app may not 
have been that representative of a person’s attributes either. Facebook likes were said to have 
formed a large part of the psychological profiling, and these are also limited if people’s 
preferences change over time, or if they are not very active from the outset (e.g. Chen & 
Potenza, 2018).   
Nevertheless, the possibility of harvesting and analysing personal information in this 
way highlights some stark issues in terms of how individuals understand threats to their data, 
how they protect themselves online, and how (or whether) they pro-actively manage the 
content they are exposed to.  Further, the Cambridge Analytica scandal represents a relatively 
unique type of data breach to be explored from a research perspective, whereby users’ norms 
and expectations of their routine online interactions were effectively exploited for political 
gain.  To our knowledge, no research has examined people’s perspectives of such 
circumstances1.  In the following section, we outline previous research and theoretical 
 
1 Perhaps the most closely-related research is the work bu Jia ans Xu (2016) who examined individuals’ concerns about privacy to activity within their social 
circles.  Jia and Xu (2016) found that people who were more concerned about their privacy tended to engage less with friends (through tagging and third-party 
application use), than those who did not.  Other research of people’s reactions to data breaches have focused on the financial costs and trends/characteristics of 
data breaches over time (e.g. Acquisto, Friedman, & Telang, 2006; Gupta & Sharman, 2012; Garrison & Ncube, 2011), public responses to specific news 
articles (Bachura et al., 2017; Fiesler & Hallinan, 2018), and people’s intentions to use online retail stores (Chakraborty, Lee, Bagchi-Sen, Upadhyaya, & 




concepts relating to people’s understanding of online privacy and discuss how these may 
relate to the Cambridge Analytica scandal.   
1.2. Theoretical Background 
1.2.1. Privacy concerns and behaviours.  
Is it likely that the Cambridge Analytica scandal prompted people to change their 
privacy settings or delete their Facebook accounts? Or were people even aware what had 
happened? Existing research on people’s privacy concerns and behaviour is fraught with 
contradiction, and it seems likely that the Cambridge Analytica scandal may echo such 
findings.  While the news reported widespread concerns over privacy online, alongside 
incitement to “take action”, it is quite likely that people did not react whatsoever.  Recent 
research has demonstrated that people feel exhausted from hearing about (seemingly) endless 
data breaches in the news, and as a result feel that attempts to do anything to protect their 
data are pointless (e.g. Choi et al., 2018; Keith, Lowry, Evans, & Babb, 2014; Lee, Son, & 
Kim, 2016; Zhang, Zhao, Lu, & Yang, 2016).  This phenomenon, known as privacy fatigue 
(Choi et al., 2018) has also been found to occur when privacy controls are complex or too 
difficult to keep track of (Keith et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2016) and due to the overwhelming 
social/psychological strains of using social networking sites (Lee et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 
2016).  Similarly, the varied ways in which people use social media – whether to keep in 
touch with family/friends, read news, or participate in civic activities (e.g. Raine, 2018) 
means that people may frequently see activity they may disagree with or find aggravating.  In 
particular, research has found that political discussions on social media have caused many 
people to feel “worn out”, and “stressed and infuriated” (Duggan & Smith, 2016).  These 
increasing feelings of losing control, both in terms of keeping up to date with privacy settings 
and from “unavoidable” exposure to stressful content may therefore cause people to 
disengage from taking measures to protect their privacy online.  This, combined with the 
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‘black box’ nature of algorithmic advertising (e.g. Eslami, Kumaran, Sandvig, & Karahalios, 
2018), and people’s inability to see or understand how their data is used may further 
strengthen such feelings.    
Attempts to understand the relationship between people’s privacy-related concerns 
and their behaviour frequently demonstrates that the two contradict, a phenomenon known as 
the privacy paradox (Barnes, 2006; Norberg et al., 2007).  People will often claim to be 
concerned about their privacy, to later disclose personal information for relatively little in 
return, such as their income or date of birth for a discount in an online shop (Beresford, 
Kübler, & Preibusch, 2012), or their phone number/address to use financial services (Norberg 
et al., 2007).  Numerous researchers have sought to understand the privacy paradox, and as a 
result have offered a range of explanations, including a lack of understanding of risk and 
knowledge of privacy-protective behaviours (Hargittai & Litt, 2013; Y. J. Park, 2013; 
Stutzman, Gross, & Acquisti, 2012), inexperience of first-hand online privacy invasions 
(Dienlin & Trepte, 2015), and social influences (e.g. sharing data because their friends and 
family do) (Van Gool, Van Ouytsel, Ponnet, & Walrave, 2015).  However, despite significant 
attempts to explain the privacy paradox over recent years, the evidence supporting these 
accounts remains contradictory and inconclusive (for a review see Kokolakis (2017) or 
Gerber, Gerber, and Volkamer (2018)).  Current evidence also offers no insight toward users’ 
privacy concerns and behaviours in the Cambridge Analytica context – indeed disclosing 
one’s date of birth to make a purchase is a far cry from the prospect of illicitly harvesting 
profile data to influence political preferences.  The unprecedented nature of the scandal 
means that we do not know how individuals perceive/understand privacy within this context, 
or indeed whether their current understanding (and subsequent behaviours) will change as a 
result.    
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Alternative explanations to the privacy paradox suggest that individuals make privacy 
decisions by evaluating the potential risks and benefits of disclosing information.  For 
instance, some researchers suggest that individuals perform a privacy calculus, in which their 
behaviour is determined by the outcome of the privacy trade-off (Dinev & Hart, 2006; Jiang, 
Heng, & Choi, 2013; Lee & Kwon, 2015).  In other words, if the perceived benefits of 
sharing data exceed the costs, then an individual will likely disclose information, for example 
sharing personal data in order to reap the benefits of loyalty programs2.  Whilst Facebook 
users likely made such decisions frequently in their use of the platform, the covert nature of 
Cambridge Analytica’s tactics rendered any privacy decisions (within this context) 
impossible.  Thus, people had no way of knowing that their data would be used, how it would 
be used, and therefore had no means to evaluate the costs/benefits of their interactions.  
Investigating people’s understanding of online privacy (and indeed whether any concerns are 
now influenced by the scandal) will highlight whether existing phenomena apply in this new 
and complex context.  
If the ways in which people make privacy related decisions in these circumstances is 
unclear, then it seems likely that people may feel confused about how to manage their data in 
the future.  One solution could simply be to delete social media accounts entirely (a move 
that was repeatedly encouraged in the scandal’s aftermath (Slawson, 2018; Timms & 
Heimans, 2018)).  However, previous research has highlighted that prior campaigns such as 
‘Quit Facebook Day’ (Portwood-Stacer, 2013; Quitfacebookday.com, 2010) have been 
ineffective because people are generally reluctant to leave due to social pressures, and the 
technological affordances it provides (e.g. receiving event updates, maintaining connections 
with weak ties) (e.g. Baumer et al., 2013)).   
 
2 Such decisions can also be affected by cognitive biases, heuristics and bounded rationality (Acquisti, 2004; Gerber et al., 2018; Kokolakis, 2017), in part 
because people lack the ability or motivation to process all possible information correctly when making decisions (Deuker, 2010).  This means that they can 
over or underestimate the costs and benefits of the situation (Flender & Müller, 2012).  
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1.2.2. Networked privacy and Communication Privacy Management theory 
Another consideration is that users lack awareness and understanding of how 
computer algorithms work, and what they can infer from their and/or others’ information.  
This notion is particularly challenging, given that algorithms are generally opaque, to the 
extent that in some cases the developers do not even know how they work (e.g. Pasquale, 
2015) .  Similarly, this is also complicated by the fact that a user’s privacy is also 
interconnected with that of other people – a notion referred to as ‘networked privacy’ 
(Marwick & Boyd, 2014).  On Facebook, people can disclose others’ information when 
publishing content, or through interaction with others.  This content can then be re-posted, or 
shared by others within their networks, who may also continue to propagate that information 
(e.g. Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2011; Jia & Xu, 2016; Wisniewski, Richter Lipford, & 
Wilson, 2012)).  In many instances sharing such data is intentional (e.g. tagging someone in a 
photo, or commenting in a post), and when this is the case, people can adjust their settings or 
take other measures in attempt to protect their privacy.  In other circumstances, users may be 
unaware that they are revealing information about other people.  For instance, research has 
demonstrated that an individual’s private attributes such as age or location can be inferred via 
others’ data, unbeknownst to the individual themselves. (e.g. Park, Lee, Han, & Lee, 2009; 
Zamal, Liu, & Ruths, 2011).  Such findings are based on the principle of homophily, the 
notion that birds of a feather flock together – which implies that individuals who share 
commonalities tend to congregate together (as reflected in their social network connections).  
The role of networked privacy was particularly prominent within the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal because the vast majority of individuals’ data was accessed via one of their network 
connections without their permission, and without anyone’s consent.   Since the news of the 
scandal made such activities explicit, exploring the extent to which people understand (or are 
even aware of) these possibilities, in addition to whether they have taken any subsequent 
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action (i.e. changing settings, deleting accounts) will provide insights that will be valuable in 
improving people’s privacy-related behaviour in the future.  
Communication Privacy Management (CPM) theory may also provide insight towards 
individuals’ concerns and behaviours.  CPM suggests that individuals use the perceived costs 
and benefits of information disclosure to establish privacy boundaries with those they 
communicate with (Petronio, 1991, 2002).  Up until recently, people may have thought that 
they had more control over their privacy boundaries, and likely did not consider how privacy 
can be collectively determined.  According to CPM theory, when boundaries are unclear, 
conflict can result as people feel their expectations of maintaining their privacy have not been 
met (i.e. their privacy has been violated).  This concept, known as ‘boundary turbulence’ 
(Petronio, 2002) often occurs unintentionally, and especially in circumstances where privacy 
boundaries are not fully understood.  Thus, the scandal represents an extreme case of 
boundary turbulence, because people had no opportunity to regulate their privacy, both in 
terms of how their information was accessed from others within their networks, and from 
their historical patterns of digital traces.  Therefore, how people subsequently perceive the 
costs and benefits of information disclosure in light of the Cambridge Analytica scandal may 
thus change the way people choose to interact online in order to reduce this perceived 
turbulence.    
In sum, existing research highlights that understanding people’s perceptions of their 
privacy online is a complex matter.  Further, this is particularly challenging when considered 
in a landscape of continually evolving computer algorithms and targeted advertising that 
access and use information in ways that may be unclear to users and considered outside of 
their control.  As we continue to leave digital patterns of our lives online, the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal therefore provides a unique opportunity to attempt to address this matter.   
To our knowledge, there is no prior work that has explored people’s perspectives within this 
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context.  For these reasons, we adopted an exploratory approach toward data collection and 
analysis, which comprised a set of semi-structured interviews and an inductive thematic 
analysis.  This conceptual approach and methodology were particularly important as this 
topic is currently unexplored and complex, and we did not want to unduly influence 
respondents’ answers with pre-defined questions used in more restrictive approaches such as 
structured interviews or surveys.   
Our work seeks to extend and contribute towards existing research in two main ways.  
First, this work will gather empirical evidence on people’s perceptions of their privacy online 
line, and how they manage their data in light of perceived risks.  Second, the work will utilise 
an inductive (‘bottom up’) thematic analysis, following the guidelines of Braun and Clarke 
(2006, 2013).  Such methods are seldom used in privacy research; hence this type of analysis 
will enable us to explore people’s responses in greater detail.  By reflecting on how the 
findings relate to existing theoretical concepts within the privacy domain, the work should 
help future researchers to explore people’s perceptions in this new and complicated arena.  
We describe our methods for this process in more detail in the following section.     
 
2. Method 
2.1. Study Design  
            To explore people’s concerns and perspectives following the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal, we adopted a qualitative approach (following the guidelines of Braun and Clarke 
(2006, 2013), where we asked participants about their understanding of online privacy, their 
protective strategies, and how they manage unwanted content (see Procedure below).  The 
study was conducted in May 2018, directly after the scandal was reported in the news.  Our 
goal was to examine participants’ thoughts and understanding in an open-ended manner, 
therefore, we conducted semi-structured interviews where our initial questions were designed 
 13 
to be quite general regarding online privacy.  This flexibility enabled us to explore 
participants’ answers in detail, without prompting any pre-determined concepts.  Further, we 
also wanted to investigate whether the scandal was affecting people’s responses and was at 
the forefront of their minds when thinking about online privacy.  Thus, to avoid priming 
participants, the scandal was not mentioned in any of the study information (recruitment 
advertisement, information sheet, consent forms, interview questions).  Given the limited 
research focused on networked privacy and the use of data for targeted persuasion efforts, we 
believe that this design provided the most appropriate basis to explore the concepts outlined 
in the introduction.  The study was approved by both university and project ethics 
committees.  
2.2. Participants and Recruitment 
We conducted semi-structured interviews with 30 Facebook users.  Participants were 
recruited through advertisements placed around campus/on the university website, and 
through snowball sampling during April-May 2018.  We chose to recruit participants from 
the university population because it provided us with access to a reasonably broad range of 
demographics in terms of age, education (i.e. subject/level of study – 
undergraduate/postgraduate, as well as staff members who did not have higher education 
qualifications) and job role (i.e. we recruited people who were employed in non-academic 
positions, such as administration, sales, and finance).  Further, the university population of 
both staff and students enabled us to obtain a sample of people who were old enough to have 
detailed histories on Facebook - younger users may not have had accounts or built up 
substantial histories during the period that data was collected by Cambridge Analytica.  A 
recent survey also highlighted that 74% of Facebook users are aged between 18-54 (Statista, 
2018) and in our sample, ages ranged from 18-46 years old (M = 26.53, SD = 7.51); 10 were 
male, and 20 were female.  Our, sample was reasonably diverse in terms of in terms of level 
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of education and occupation; 5 participants were mature students (i.e. they were undertaking 
studies following/alongside employment), and 9 participants were employed (in a variety of 
roles including administration, sales consultancy, and web design).  Table 1 displays the full 
breakdown of the demographics per participant.  Note, in order to preserve participants’ 
anonymity, ID numbers are not reported in Table 1.  Thus, the order in which participants’ 
details appear does not correspond to the ID numbers reported in the results section.   
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
2.3. Procedure 
To take part in the study, participants had to meet the following criteria: 1) log in to 
Facebook at least once daily, and 2) be willing to discuss their activities and opinions with a 
researcher.  Interview sessions were conducted in a private laboratory on campus and lasted 
between 20 minutes and 1 hour.  Upon arrival to the lab, participants were asked to complete 
a series of forms, which asked for their: 1) demographic information, 2) Facebook usage 
(using the questionnaire adapted from Ross et al. (2009)), and 3) informed consent.    
At the start of the interview, participants were informed that the purpose of the study 
was to investigate people’s understanding of online privacy, and to establish whether there 
are common trends in the way that people choose to interact and view content on Facebook. 
The researcher asked the participant a series of warm-up questions about their general 
Facebook usage and behaviour – e.g., how they interact with others, and the type of content 
they tend to like and share amongst their networks.  Then, the researcher proceeded to ask 
questions regarding their thoughts on privacy and potential risks to their data, specifically: 1) 
What is your understanding of online privacy, 2) How do you protect yourself in online 
contexts, and 3) How do you avoid unwanted content?  As mentioned previously, these 
questions were purposely designed to be broad in order to gauge whether participants’ 
responses had been influenced by the scandal.  For each question, the researcher listened to 
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the participants and asked them to expand on their answers, and followed up with further 
questions accordingly.  If participants did not mention the scandal, the researcher asked them 
if they were aware of Cambridge Analytica towards the end of the interview, and asked 
whether it was something they were concerned about.  Table 1 outlines whether each 
participant was aware of the scandal.  At the end of the interview, participants were fully 
debriefed – the researcher explained what would happen to their data, and participants were 
given the opportunity to withdraw their consent (none did).  They then completed another 
consent form, confirming they were happy for their data to be analysed and written-up.  
Participants were compensated £10 for their time.     
2.4.  Data Analysis 
Interviews were audio recorded and transcribed.  All personally identifying 
information was removed or anonymised. We analysed the transcripts by conducting a 
thematic analysis in line with the approach outlined by Braun and Clark (2013, 2006).  A 
thematic analysis is a qualitative method that focuses on extracting themes and patterns 
within data through interpretation (Berg, 2004).  Our thematic analysis was inductive (i.e. 
data driven) so that themes could be directly formed from the original data.  This also 
allowed us to explore the data without any pre-conceived ideas.  Our analysis consisted of 
four stages, comprising open coding, axial coding, and selective coding. First, a preliminary 
set of codes were identified through open coding.  Here, two researchers (first and second 
authors) independently read through the transcripts and generated a set of codes.  The 
researchers then collated and discussed their codes in order to develop/refine a series of 
concepts.  Second, codes were further developed through axial coding.  A researcher 
extracted data from the codes by combining and/or splitting them into a series of overarching 
themes and subthemes.  Third, themes were further refined through a final iteration of 
selective coding, where transcripts were re-read and data relating to the core themes 
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identified were coded.  Lastly, definitions and names for each theme identified were 
finalised.    
3. Results 
Our analysis highlighted a rich and diverse set of opinions and perspectives.  Overall, 11 
participants mentioned Cambridge Analytica without prompting throughout their interview, 
and 23 participants were aware of the scandal (when subsequently asked by the interviewer). 
While we do not know the extent to which the scandal influenced the responses from those 
who had knowledge but did not reference it directly, their insights (as well as those who had 
no knowledge whatsoever) provide insight into people’s current thoughts on this landscape.  
To that end, we include a code next to each quotation, which includes the participant number 
(P) followed by whether they were aware (A) or unaware (U) of the scandal.  We organise 
our findings across three main categories, specifically 1) Contradictory concerns and beliefs, 
2) Coping strategies, and 3) Staying versus leaving Facebook.  These categories broadly align 
with each of our main questions (i.e. what is your understanding of online privacy, how do 
you protect yourself in online contexts, and how do you avoid unwanted content?)  Within 
each category we discuss two related sub-themes that capture participants’ most prominent 
thoughts, feelings and attitudes that were generated from the interviews (see Figure 2 for a 
taxonomy of these themes/sub-themes).  We describe these themes and discuss their relation 
to existing research in the remainder of this section.   
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
3.1. Contradictory Concerns and Beliefs 
When asked about their understanding of privacy, one of the themes most prominent 
in individuals’ answers was the extent to which they feel concerned about their data.  In 
particular, these concerns appeared to be provoked by the notion of feeling “threatened” 
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when organisations might be monitoring them, or using their data in unknown ways.  
However, these feelings were also fraught with contradictory perspectives regarding the 
future of their privacy. In some cases, participants felt like the situation was hopeless, 
whereas others believed that they could actively improve and manage how their information 
spreads online. Such patterns of contradictory perspectives reflect similar work on privacy 
attitudes and behaviours more broadly.  These findings are elucidated in more detail below.   
3.1.1.  I feel safe, but that’s creepy  
Overall, participants conveyed mixed sentiments towards their privacy on Facebook, 
which ranged from “I’m not bothered”, to “I’m extremely concerned”.  It seemed that these 
polarised views were, to some degree, reflected in participants’ awareness of the scandal.  For 
instance, those who described feeling comfortable with their privacy settings frequently 
expressed a “nothing to hide” mentality, where they had no concern sharing information 
amongst their networks.  However, such expressions were made by those who had no 
awareness of Cambridge Analytica.  As such, they attributed their lack of concern to the fact 
that their privacy settings were “private” (which would be sufficient in preventing strangers 
or unauthorised organisations from accessing their data), and that they were cautious in what 
they posted, both in terms of personal data (e.g. they did not share credit card or address 
details) or in their opinions and thoughts:  
“… I can’t think of anything I post that I wouldn’t… like I don’t really care if other 
people would see it…  it’s not like I’m posting my credit card details or anything, and if 
someone really wanted to they could share one of my posts… So, it doesn’t make much of a 
difference to me like, you know, I’ve got nothing to hide on Facebook.  (P20-U).  
In contrast, participants who referenced the scandal expressed more concern, although 
many acknowledged that this would depend on the context in which their data was being 
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used.  For instance, one person explained how they were happy for others to see their posts, 
but not if their data was used for other purposes:   
“… I don’t mind people seeing I like this post, but that is involving, like privacy issues 
recently, like the Cambridge thing… If I like the post and they use the information for 
other purposes, like commercials and that, then this is something quite scary…  It’s 
like someone’s looking behind whatever you’re doing.  I really don’t like that.” (P24-
A) 
Further, irrespective of whether participants felt concerned about their privacy, everyone who 
mentioned Cambridge Analytica considered themselves to be “immune” or unlikely to be 
influenced by psychological targeting.  They stated that this was because they were “well-
educated” about their political beliefs (P8-A, “privileged” (i.e. not from a minority or 
disadvantaged background) (P29-A), “not vulnerable” (i.e. they considered themselves to be 
technologically savvy and aware of possible risks) (P1-A), or generally “not a target” (P18-
A).  Despite this, participants frequently described targeted advertising as “freaky” or 
“creepy” (P19-A, P24-A).  This was particularly the case when targeted advertisements 
appeared after looking at something once, or immediately after browsing another website.  
For example:  
“…When I search for items on eBay, and then all of a sudden, I get Facebook ads 
drawing my attention to exactly what I’ve searched on eBay.  I thought, ‘How on 
earth does Facebook know what I’ve searched for on eBay?’ I mean, I’m still not 
clear about it, but then I do worry…  My goodness, how does this work? How is it 
connected? I just can’t figure out what the connection is…” (P8-A).     
Alternatively, participants also reflected on times where they found targeted advertising 
useful.  For instance, one participant explained how targeted advertisements from the 
accommodation website Zoopla helped them to find a home: 
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“So, I see quite a few ads from Zoopla and I was like, ‘Well, fair enough, I did spend 
three days looking for accommodation on there’, but that stuff is actually quite 
useful.” (P12-A) 
 Overall these findings suggest that participants tend to view online privacy 
simplistically (e.g. if they refrain from disclosing their bank details, then their data is safe).  
They were also unaware that personal information could be inferred through their interactions 
or via their friends’/followers’ interactions within their networks.  Thus, the belief that one 
has “nothing to hide” is naïve to this possibility, as well as to the concept of networked 
privacy.  This naivety also appeared to extend to individuals’ perceptions of targeted 
advertisements.  When targeted advertisements “make sense” and reflect a person’s 
behaviour or interests (i.e. they feel like they understand why they are seeing it, they 
experience no concern.  Alternatively, advertisements are perceived as creepy or unnerving 
when individuals have no recollection of viewing the associated content online.  In these 
instances, individuals’ worries appeared to be focused on the contextual intricacies of how 
organisations obtained and targeted data accurately, rather than on the consequences that such 
communications may have.  As a result, individuals seemed to be in denial about their 
susceptibility to the persuasive effects of communications such as those made by Cambridge 
Analytica.     
Further, these findings reflect typical sentiments expressed in privacy research more 
broadly.  For instance, previous research has described instances where individuals perceive 
privacy intrusions as “creepy” to later say they are unbothered (e.g. Phelan, Arbor, & 
Resnick, 2016).  Similarly, Shklovski, Mainwaring, Skúladóttir, and Borgthorsson (2014) 
found that while people often disliked tracking and third party data collection, they could also 
see valid and legitimate reasons for collecting data (e.g. personalised services).  However, it 
is not just privacy perspectives that contradict here, it is people’s views on the effectiveness 
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of targeted advertising to influence political preferences.  The overwhelming perception that 
they are resistant to any persuasive communications stands in stark contrast to the supposed 
success of Cambridge Analytica’s attempts to influence.    
3.1.2.  There’s nothing I can do, but I’ll help. 
The ramifications of the Cambridge Analytica scandal provoked further mixed sentiments 
surrounding whether participants could effectively do anything to stop their data being used 
in similar ways in the future.  Many participants expressed thoughts of feeling “helpless”, 
and that the “damage is done”, where third parties have already taken their data, expressing 
they have “given up” and will continue using Facebook without changing anything.  For 
instance, one participant explained:  
“…with stuff like the recent Facebook scandal, it’s like you don’t realise how open 
your data is.  I feel like a lot of companies probably do have my data now and I’ve 
just kind of got to the point where I’ve accepted, the basic data, I don’t care about 
sharing that with third parties anymore because I know most of them probably have it 
by this point.” (P28-A) 
In a similar vein, some participants reported feeling “trapped”, describing that they are 
concerned about how their data is being used, yet they need to keep their account because 
Facebook enables them to stay in touch with friends and family.  For example:  
“After that [scandal] happened, I went back to my Facebook account and started to 
raise the privacy of my account… So I started to be more conscious of my rights as a 
user of social media, and I tried to do things, but the problem is, I don’t do everything 
I want because this means that that would limit my use of Facebook… the other 
alternative would be to deactivate my account… But then, this is what keeps me in 
touch with friends and family, so I decided to stay with Facebook and just keep an eye 
on what I’m doing.” (P25-A)  
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Despite some participants’ sense of losing control, others described more active efforts to 
inhibit the spreading of controversial or negative content by reporting them to Facebook.  
Although such actions do not affect an individual’s own account/data directly, these types of 
perspectives demonstrate an attitude of serving the “greater good”, by attempting to prevent 
“bad” content from spreading through others’ networks.  For example, one participant 
described how they regularly reported Britain First (a far-right political party in the UK, 
whose Facebook page has since been deactivated after repeatedly violating community 
guidelines):     
“… I reported them [Britain First] almost constantly… the response I got was always 
rubbish like… ‘We have reviewed it and it has not broken our terms’. I’m like, it has, 
but sometimes it’s not the post that necessarily has, but the comments that have led off 
it.” (P18-A) 
Finally, others reported an element of hypocrisy in other people’s behaviour or rationality 
generally.  Specifically, one participant explained that while many people seemed worried, 
they often readily gave away their data without checking the organisation’s terms and 
conditions:    
“We all are very exposed aren’t we, in so many ways.  Everything we do is exposed 
and we sell it to ourselves because most of the time they say, ‘Oh if you like us and 
comment here and give us your Facebook, you will get a free cappuccino from 
Starbucks’… so everyone’s going to give you all the data you want… Most people 
don’t care about their privacy… and they don’t even read the terms and conditions, 
they just click ‘accept.’” (P4-A)  
The sense of powerlessness experienced following the scandal reflects previous work on 
learned helplessness (e.g. Seligman, 1972; Shklovski et al., 2014).  Learned helplessness (i.e. 
the belief that a situation is unchangeable, even if solutions subsequently become available) 
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has been associated with other instances where individuals have learned how their data is 
used and distributed, such as in mobile applications (Shklovski et al., 2014), or after 
experiencing a data breach (Bott & Renaud, 2018; Choi et al., 2018).  However, the sense of 
stopping “bad” information from spreading (by actively reporting persuasive content) 
suggests that individuals are not completely resigned to such loss of control.  The distinction 
between these findings is that individuals must give up their data (to a certain degree) in 
order to use Facebook and they have little (or no) control over what organisations do with 
that information.  Yet when organisations’ intentions are visible (e.g. influencing political 
preferences), and it is possible to act on these activities (e.g. reporting Britain First), then they 
are perceived as a means by which people can help others at a broader collectivistic level.  
These discrepancies also relate back to our previous finding that people believe they are 
immune to persuasive communications, whereas other more vulnerable or “less savvy” 
people are not. Thus, the cost-benefit analysis they perform in giving-up/accepting their data 
is taken may not seem so drastic when they believe they are resilient to persuasive 
communications.  Yet by attempting to intervene or prevent (what are perceived as) 
politically harmful communications from spreading, they can help to protect those who are 
more “susceptible".  
3.2. Coping Strategies 
In order to manage some of the concerns discussed above, participants described numerous 
strategies they use to manage how their accounts are displayed to others, and how others’ 
posts are displayed to them.  In some instances, this was to maintain privacy, in other cases it 
was to manage people that they found “annoying”.  Many participants also acknowledged 
that they should “pay more attention” or update their privacy settings, but found doing so 
tiresome and tedious. 
3.2.1. Managing me, managing you. 
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Participants frequently described being aware of how they appear on Facebook. 
Primarily, this related to how others perceive them, and what they are willing to share (rather 
than what third parties may do with their data).  Overall, participants displayed relatively 
open attitudes towards their self-disclosure, with some expressing “nothing to hide” 
mentalities, e.g. “… I don’t see the point in like, putting on a façade.” (P29-A).  Others were 
more conservative in their approaches and described how they monitor and maintain who 
sees their profile.  These included holding regular “friendship culls” (P6-A, P11-U, P12-A, 
P15-A, P26-U), or “checks” to see what their profile looks like to others (P11-U, P18-A, P23-
U).  The main reasons participants had for performing culls were to maintain “close” friends 
within their networks, and to weed-out friends they found annoying or that had conflicting 
opinions to their own.  For example, one participant described:  
“I have a Facebook cull every year where I get rid of anyone whose name I didn’t 
recognise… I’ll get rid of anyone who I’ve not talked to all year, or who I don’t enjoy 
seeing their posts from.  So, someone I was friends with but they posted a lot of stuff 
to do with the British National Party and UKIP and a lot of things which I just really 
disagreed with and really angered me, so I was just like, ‘I’m sorry, I’m going to have 
to unfriend you because it’s not good.’” (P12-A) 
Alternatively, inspecting their own profile, and viewing how it appears to others (by using the 
“View As” button) was a common approach that participants used to check their profile was 
displayed as they intended.  This provided participants with a sense of “security” (P23-A) or 
reassurance in their privacy settings.  For example: 
“… I always have a little look and double-check everything… I’ll just go through and 
check that all my photo albums are set to, like, friends, maybe friends of friends, and 
yeah, any information I don’t want visible to everyone, just make sure that’s all just 
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set to what I want.  I like the fact that it’s got the ‘View As’ thing, so that you can view 
as a stranger and get to see exactly what they can see.” (P11-U)  
Similarly, another participant described adjusting their privacy settings depending on the type 
of content they were posting.  Specifically, they would filter out different posts to different 
people in their network, especially when posting or sharing something that may conflict with 
others’ values or beliefs: 
“… you can filter out what you don’t want to see before you post, so I use that quite 
often, actually, especially when it comes to some posts that might be a bit too sensitive 
for my parents, like gay marriage support, or something.” (P1-A)  
These findings highlight that people are generally aware of how others perceive them and 
take steps to mitigate how they present themselves to others, by controlling “who sees what”.   
However, this awareness appears to be limited to their own posts/disclosures to their 
friends/followers.  Beyond that, individuals do not seem to consider the broader implications 
of their interactions and how these may inform the design of targeted advertisements.  
Instead, participants decisions to manage what others see was driven by the desire to manage 
annoyances – to stop themselves from seeing content they find aggravating, rather than to 
prevent organisations from inferring information about them.  Again, perhaps this is also 
linked to participants’ perceptions that they are immune to such operations.  It also suggests 
that people are naïve to networked privacy.  Thus, while having “nothing to hide” may be a 
liberating thought when sharing opinions and aspects of their lives, the participants did not 
realise the subtle and more nuanced ways that such interactions can “leak” their personal 
information.  
3.2.2. I must update my privacy settings… maybe later. 
Although participants did not consider Cambridge Analytica when describing how 
they manage who sees their information, Cambridge Analytica seemed to be at the forefront 
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of most participants’ minds when asked about their privacy directly.  For instance, many 
participants mentioned “recent events in the news” when asked how worried they were. That 
said, no one described feeling more concerned as a result of the scandal.  Many participants 
mentioned that they “probably should check” (P10-A, P13-U) their privacy settings, and read 
Facebook’s terms and conditions (as well as those on other websites/platforms), but described 
finding the time or the inclination to do so difficult.  For example: 
“I did do the other day [read Facebook’s terms and conditions].  It was after work 
and I was on my laptop and I was like, ‘This is really boring this’, and it was page 
after page, and it was next, next, next…” (P13-U) 
Further, one participant described a desire to stay “in denial”, despite being warned about 
potential privacy threats:     
“Sometimes things get shared on Facebook, where someone says, ‘Did you know that 
if you haven’t done this, then people can see this,’ and I’ll think, ‘Oh! Is that true? I 
better have a look at that’.  But otherwise, I’ll just live in denial.  I think that 
everything is fine and private, and probably it isn’t.” (P10-A) 
These contradictory thoughts could possibly be explained by a lack of trust and general 
confusion that participants described in terms of how privacy settings work, especially when 
they are “constantly changing”.  For instance, one participant explained:  
“I think Facebook’s made it very difficult for you to remain very private.  Like, maybe 
I don’t know, maybe they’ve changed it now, but I remember like maybe two years 
ago when I was trying to… push down my privacy, I found it really difficult to be able 
to tick all the boxes that meant I was completely private because it just felt like I was 
just getting through some hoops… Friends of friends, they were still finding my 
profile… Because it almost seems like they don’t want you to be private… Well, 
obviously they don’t because I don’t think that’s come up, they want your profile to be 
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as private but also as public as it possibly can, so I think they make it very difficult for 
you to just like really limit yourself to just your friends.” (P7-A) 
Alternatively, one aspect that many participants seemed particularly concerned by was 
Facebook’s facial recognition feature.  At the time of our interviews, Facebook’s new facial 
recognition software had been launched in the UK (Tamblyn, 2018; Welch, 2018), and many 
participants had received an update asking for their permission to turn it on.  Many 
participants who mentioned facial recognition, described that they did not want to enable it, 
because they did not trust it was safe:   
“Now there’s an update thing asking me whether you wanted it [Facebook] to use 
facial recognition.  I think I said no for the time being.  I wasn’t sure.  And they said it 
was a good thing so that people couldn’t use your photographs without your consent, 
but I don’t know, maybe I’m being too naïve, but I can’t imagine people particularly 
doing that anyway.” (P17-A) 
Overall, participants' thoughts reflect other recent findings that indicate people’s lethargy 
over constantly changing security policies and data breaches (Bachura, Valecha, Chen, & 
Rao, 2017; Choi et al., 2018; Fiesler & Hallinan, 2018).  Thus, not only is keeping up-to-date 
tiresome, when people do make the effort to update their settings/read policies etc., they are 
quickly deterred or confused by the overwhelming amount of information they are confronted 
with.  Remaining in a state of denial about potential risks and threats to personal data relieves 
individuals of having to worry about organisations taking/using their data and enables them 
to continue using Facebook unhindered.  Likewise, the risks posed by organisations such as 
Cambridge Analytica are much more subtle than other types of threats.  That is, receiving 
targeted communications intended to influence political preferences does not pose the same 
consequences as having one’s bank or address details stolen.  The individuals in our study 
generally did not know whether their data had been used or not – therefore it may be easier to 
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remain in denial (in cases like these) because such threats pose no direct personal impact.  
Alternatively, previous research of individuals who have experienced a data breach suggests 
that people experience denial in a similar way to the denial experienced in the grieving 
process, where individuals experience disbelief over their own privacy loss and instead 
assume it is something that happens to other people (Bott & Renaud, 2018).  
3.3. Staying Versus Leaving Facebook 
Finally, many participants expressed mixed emotions and general confusion over whether 
they should keep using Facebook or delete their accounts altogether.  Despite many reporting 
increasing frustrations with Facebook, and also with many of their ‘friends’, it appeared that 
the need to keep their connections with others prevented them from leaving.  Further, many 
of the features provided by Facebook in terms of blocking, unfollowing, or hiding others’ 
posts appeared to help mitigate most of these annoyances.  In all cases, declarations of 
wanting to leave did not appear to be motivated by the scandal explicitly, indicating that such 
sentiments are complex and multifaceted.  
3.3.1. I’ve had enough… but I can’t leave. 
Almost all participants expressed some form of anger or feeling of being “fed-up” 
with Facebook. These feelings stemmed from other people’s behaviour (e.g. annoying posts), 
rather than content displayed in advertisements, fake news, or (perceived) threats to their 
data.  Specifically, frustrations of others’ (supposed) narcissistic tendencies in the form of 
“posting selfies”, (P1-A, P10-A), “attention seeking” (P18-A, P29-A), and generally 
“showing off” (P9-A), were participants’ main annoyances.  As a result, some participants 
explained that they had distanced themselves, and tried to reduce the amount of time that they 
spent using Facebook:      
“So, if someone just keeps on doing something that’s really annoying because, you 
know, when you’re looking at something you can feel it, you can feel yourself getting 
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annoyed and I think it’s more…  I’m like, you are absolutely entitled to your opinion 
but also I don’t want to feel this way when I look at my phone.” (P18-A)  
However, despite many participants’ increasing frustrations, some commented that they 
could not deactivate their accounts.  This was because they had some form of reliance on 
Facebook. These sentiments were also expressed earlier, where participants provided 
accounts of feeling “trapped”.  For example: 
“I was like, ‘What if I just delete the network or my account from here? But then I 
wouldn’t be contactable for gigs and I thought, ‘Okay, I’d better not’.” (P13-U) 
Other participants explained that they now consider Facebook to be a part of their history, 
and that they like keeping a digital record of their life.  One participant even described 
deactivating their account because they found other people annoying, but then returned a few 
weeks later because they felt Facebook was a part of their identity:  
“I have a history on Facebook… I did deactivate the account for quite some time 
because I felt like it was a bit distracting to me, like I’d go to Facebook every single 
half hour, which is too often to me and it’s distracting.  So, I deactivated for a while, 
maybe two or three weeks, and then I went back to it because, as I said, you feel like 
Facebook is part of you.  If you’ve been on Facebook for ten years now, you have 
all... your posts, even your comments as part of your history…  So, when you put it on 
Facebook, it’s like, people before… they used to write diaries…” (P25-A)  
Similar to our previous findings, participants tended to express anger over other people’s 
posts rather than over third parties targeting them with ‘persuasive’ advertisements.  Such 
annoyances were enough to make people consider closing their accounts, yet ultimately 
people felt a need to stay in order to maintain connections with others, or for some other 
practical reason.  This reflects previous findings which have also demonstrated that people 
are often reluctant to leave social media due to the social cost and inconvenience involved in 
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doing so (e.g. Fiesler & Hallinan, 2018; Schreiner & Hess, 2015).  The Cambridge Analytica 
scandal was not at the forefront of participants’ explanations when describing their thought 
processes surrounding leaving Facebook.  This could also be due to the lack of perceived 
threat of persuasive communications, as other research has found privacy concerns to be a 
sufficient catalyst to incite leaving (e.g. Baumer et al., 2013; Shklovski et al., 2014).  For 
instance Stieger, Burger, Bohn, & Voracek (2013) found that Facebook “quitters” frequently 
cited concerns over the treatment of personal data by organisations as a main reason for 
leaving.  This therefore suggests that absence of this perceived risk, combined with the cost 
of leaving explains why the scandal did not provoke participants to close their accounts.   
3.3.2. To block, or not to block? 
In relation to participants’ considerations about leaving Facebook, many described 
their approaches toward handling unwanted or annoying communications.  Interestingly, all 
participants reported having some form of unwanted communication or behaviour from 
people within and outside of their networks.  These included suspicious (or “unusual”) 
contact from strangers (P10-A, P15-A, P25-A), communications from ex-partners (P11-A, 
P20-U, P27-A), or some form of harassment (P18-A, P20-U).  In some cases, unwanted 
communications were considered to be easy to deal with, such as blocking strangers who sent 
“friend requests” or messages (P10-A, P21-U).  For example: 
“… I had someone who sent me a message… I wasn’t friends with him on Facebook, 
we had like one mutual friend.  I must have appeared in the timeline when it’s got 
suggested friends there.  He just sent me a message, ‘Oh you’re really pretty…  I want 
to know if you’re single.’ Oh, for god’s sake! It just came out of nowhere, so I blocked 
him in case he sent anything else.” (P21-U)  
In other cases, participants described how they handled more complicated situations, where 
simply blocking or “unfriending” would be inappropriate.  These were circumstances where 
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participants felt they had to deal with a kind of “social politics”, where they needed to 
maintain a relationship/connection with someone, yet they did not want to maintain their 
Facebook friendship with them.  Examples of these types of relationships included close 
family members (e.g. their sister-in-law) and friends.  In these instances, participants 
explained that they found the “unfollow” or “hide” functions useful for managing this.  For 
example:  
“I did that [unfollowed] with some of my family members.  I kept that as a secret of 
course… When I felt they went too far on criticising whatever I put on Facebook and 
saying that I come from a different world… because I live somewhere else…” (P25-
A) 
Another described that they unfollowed one of their friends because they liked them, but 
disagreed with their political opinions:   
“One guy was talking about Brexit a lot and wanted to leave, so I was like… I didn’t 
want to unfriend him because I actually really like him, but I also just didn’t want to 
hear his misinformed comments.  So, I was like, I know he’s going to say something 
probably quite rude, and that’s not the way forward.” (P18-A) 
Not only did the hide or unfollow functions enable participants to preserve social obligations, 
they helped participants to protect the feelings of people they did not particularly like, or 
found offensive or annoying, since some participants considered outright blocking or 
unfriending to be “mean”. (P10-A)  
 In line with our earlier findings, many participants described receiving unwanted or 
frustrating communications, yet the focus of such annoyance primarily related to content 
posted by their friends, rather than from external organisations.  The intricate strategies that 
people develop to manage such communications – striking a balance between reducing their 
personal distaste and preserving their relationships appear to mitigate these issues.  The idea 
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that such information could come in the form of targeted advertisements did not appear to 
resonate in participants’ rationales, or if they did such troubles were overridden by the more 
aggravating actions of those within their networks. 
4. Discussion 
4.1. Theoretical Implications 
Our findings highlight two main trends across participants’ perspectives: 1) 
individuals lack understanding of their networked privacy - they lack knowledge/awareness 
of how information can be derived through others’ interactions, and that this information can 
be used to inform the design of targeted advertisements, and 2) individuals think that they are 
immune to targeted advertisements/persuasive communications (as used in the efforts of 
Cambridge Analytica).  A lack of understanding in both of these areas illustrates the complex 
nature of how information is communicated and shared by individuals (both knowingly and 
unknowingly), and subsequently used by organisations.  Therefore, without such awareness it 
seems unlikely that individuals will be able to make truly informed decisions about the 
privacy of their personal data online.        
A number of participants reported increased concern about their privacy as a result of 
the scandal, whereas those who had not heard of Cambridge Analytica described feeling 
unbothered.  Individuals with “nothing to hide” mentalities viewed privacy more literally (i.e. 
they are happy to share aspects of their lives with others), and logically (i.e. refraining from 
posting bank details meaning they are not “at risk”) rather than as something that could be 
violated through more subtle or covert means.  Similar reasoning was expressed by 
participants who described concerns about how organisations obtain and use their data, where 
they reported worries about data misuse without any knowledge or understanding as to how 
this occurs.  This lack of understanding could be explained by related research that has found 
that people feel overwhelmed and fatigued by opaque practices of organisations as well as 
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frequent data breaches reported in the news (Choi et al., 2018; Hargittai & Marwick, 2016; 
Keith et al., 2014), meaning they stop trying to stay up-to-date with such developments.  
Although no-one claimed to feel exhausted by the news of the scandal explicitly, this could 
be inherent in participants’ lack of outrage/shock about the story.      
These insights also suggest that individuals have no understanding of the role of their 
networks in contributing towards how advertisements may be crafted and psychologically 
tailored toward them.  This exposes their potential naivety towards privacy risks and lack of 
understanding of how their information can be inferred from others within their networks 
(rather than solely from their own accounts).  However, whether this makes them more 
“vulnerable” than knowledgeable individuals is unclear.  For instance, other research has 
found that knowledge of security does not necessarily predict whether individuals will 
behave more securely (Arianezhad, Camp, Kelley, & Stebila, 2013; Kelley & Bertenthal, 
2015; Tambini, 2018) and this is further complicated when a person’s vulnerability is also 
dependent on the knowledge and actions of others within their networks.  Despite this, some 
participants were vocal about “taking action” by reporting controversial or negative content 
to Facebook.  This demonstrates that people were mindful of harmful content spreading 
through their networks and were motivated in helping to protect others.  The willingness to 
actively try and disrupt these types of activities contrasts with the aforementioned perceptions 
of cynicism, helplessness, or that such endeavors are now pointless (Choi et al., 2018; Keith 
et al., 2014).  Perhaps the difference here is that certain efforts to influence are more 
transparent and provide a means by which they can be challenged/disrupted, and where 
consequences for these interventions are also visible.   For instance, it was often political 
content that provoked these reactions – but content that was posted in various groups (not via 
advertisements specifically), that people could report to Facebook for violating certain 
guidelines (or if it conflicted with their values and they deemed it harmful).  Increasing 
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aggravation regarding political content has been reported in numerous studies and reports 
over the last few years (Duggan & Smith, 2016; Vraga, Thorson, Kligler-Vilenchik, & Gee, 
2015).  Thus, actions where people report or attempt to diffuse, counter, or block such 
content could act as a strong incentive to hinder those types of messages pervading on 
Facebook.  
Another explanation for participants’ apparent indifference toward the scandal is that 
none reported that their data was used by Cambridge Analytica, or that they had personally 
experienced a data breach.  Previous research has indicated that attitudes toward privacy and 
data breaches tend to be based on heuristics or secondhand experiences, which are not 
enough to influence more secure or cautious behaviour (Dienlin & Trepte, 2015; Gerber et 
al., 2018).  Similarly, people are often believed to suffer from an “illusion of control” when 
dealing with the privacy of their data.  Brandimarte, Acquisti, & Loewenstein (2013) found 
that individuals appear to confuse the control they have when publishing their information   
with the control that third parties have when assessing that information.  As a result, 
individuals are more likely to allow their personal information to be published, and even 
share more personal information if they are given explicit control of this process.  Yet, when 
a third party is responsible for the publication of such data, they may perceive this as a loss of 
control and express concerns about it (Brandimarte et al., 2013).  It seems plausible that 
similar effects were occurring here – participants did not experience a loss of control, by not 
experiencing the data breach first hand, and by not realising what their data may 
surreptitiously reveal (i.e. it would be impossible to know which of their posts, likes, 
information etc. obtained via their networks contributed to psychologically tailored 
advertisements).  This may therefore make it difficult or unrealistic for a person to experience 
outrage or panic in response to the scandal.   
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Previous research on people’s reactions to data breaches may also help to justify our 
findings, as studies have found similar effects where participants have reported feeling that 
they have “nothing to hide” or that “rich people will be targeted” rather than themselves 
(Solove, 2007; Zou, Mhaidli, Mccall, & Schaub, 2018).  However, such research has largely 
focused on the economic costs (Acquisti & Grossklags, 2007; Layton & Watters, 2014), the 
characteristics and trends (Gupta & Sharman, 2012; Garrison & Ncube, 2011), and public 
reactions made via social media channels and news article comments (Bachura et al., 2017; 
Bott & Renaud, 2018; Fiesler & Hallinan, 2018) to data breaches, not on people’s personal 
reactions to this new type of activity.  A common finding amongst these studies (where actual 
victims or data breaches were studied) is that people exhibit emotions that resemble reactions 
to other losses or grieving processes (Bachura et al., 2017; Bott & Renaud, 2018).  As such, 
individuals are believed to experience denial, anxiety, and anger (akin to Kübler-Ross’ five-
stages of grief (Kübler-Ross & Kessler, 2005)) before reaching a level of acceptance of the 
intrusion.  Although we were unable to study these aspects (as no participants reported 
experiencing a data breach here), the finding that individuals’ sentiments reflected other 
attitudes broadly found in privacy research suggests that similar emotions may be associated 
with these types of breaches.  Further, it highlights that people cannot differentiate between 
the two disparate contexts.  Losing personal data is markedly distinct from the psychological 
inferences made by Cambridge Analytica, as privacy could be violated without any explicit 
breach of their information (i.e. it is inferred through patterns in theirs’ and others’ data).  
Thus, participants view privacy as something that is more tangible and within their control 
than this new reality where it can be violated more coercively.    
 Participants inability to distinguish between the different characteristics of the scandal 
and more “typical” data breaches also raises questions about their belief of being “immune” 
to psychological targeting.  Hence, if persuasive advertisements are ineffective (in the context 
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of political communications), then does it really matter what organisations do with their 
information?  Or, if these individuals are immune, do they need to consider how their online 
activity may therefore impact others who are more susceptible? Such considerations did not 
appear to be prevalent in participants’ mindsets.  Further, the notion that participants found 
some advertisements creepy highlighted that their lack of understanding of how accurately 
information had been obtained and crafted, not on worries about their susceptibility to that 
information.  Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) (Rogers, 1975) may help to explain this, 
as it suggests that people assess whether something is threatening, and then whether they feel 
able to cope with that threat (e.g. change their behaviour). Thus, finding targeted 
advertisements creepy indicates that people do not know how their online behaviour has 
caused the ad to be targeted toward them in the first place.  Consequently, this means that 
they cannot necessarily change their behaviour in order to protect themselves from this 
happening again.  Alternatively, when individuals perceive targeted advertisements to be 
more logical to their activities/preferences, they may feel more confident in taking measures 
to protect themselves (should they want to).  Our findings highlighted that targeted 
advertisements such as these were often viewed positively as they acted as reminders or 
helped people to locate what they wanted.   
Studies that have examined perceptions of targeted advertising have displayed similar 
results.  For instance, algorithms used in targeted advertising are typically opaque (i.e. users 
generally do not know how they work).  The feeling of “being watched” and making accurate 
(or “creepy”) inferences from people’s data can decrease trust in behavioural advertising.  In 
an attempt to mitigate this, some advertisers have made their algorithmic processes 
transparent to alleviate users’ concerns (e.g. Facebook, 2019; Google, 2019).  Eslami, 
Kumaran, Sandvig, & Karahalios (2018) examined how revealing parts of algorithmic 
processes to users affected their perceptions towards advertisements and their own privacy.  
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They found that users preferred interpretable explanations about why advertisements were 
presented, however users found vague or oversimplified language to be untrustworthy.  
Problematically, it seemed that participants found interpretability and simplicity “creepy”, 
and as such did not want to be exposed to information they felt uncomfortable with.   
It may also be the case that participants’ beliefs that they were resistant to influence 
related to cognitive dissonance processes, where people feel uncomfortable holding 
contradictory beliefs or values. In order to reduce the perceived dissonance between 
conflicting thoughts and behaviours, people may change either their beliefs or their 
behaviours (Festinger, 1957). For instance, users may enjoy using Facebook, since it enables 
them to maintain relationships and enjoy the other benefits that the platform has to offer.  If 
they become aware of potential privacy risks or threats relating to their use of the platform, 
then they may either choose to change their behaviour to reduce the perceived risk or adapt 
their cognitions with regards to the likely personal risks. It was evident from the interviews 
that participants did not show high levels of awareness regarding the wider privacy 
implications of their online interactions – whether this stemmed from denial of the issue, 
active avoidance of materials that aim to raise awareness of these risks, or simply not 
previously being exposed to such information, remains unclear. 
Finally, participants conveyed mixed emotions when discussing whether to keep or 
close their Facebook accounts.  Many explained that they had considered this, or had closed 
their accounts at some point (no one had done so in response to the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal, however), only to return later on.  This pattern of behaviour, known as social media 
reversion (Baumer, Guha, Quan, Mimno, & Gay, 2015) has been suggested to occur due to 
reasons including perceived addiction, social boundary negotiation (i.e. privacy, surveillance 
and impression management), usage of other platforms, and their friends’ reactions to non-
use (Baumer, Sun & Schaedler, 2018; Baumer et al., 2015; Guha, Baumer & Gay, 2018).  
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Our findings appeared to reinforce elements of these findings, as participants who described 
returning to Facebook felt that they needed to keep their accounts in order to stay connected 
to their friends.  Similarly, those expressing desires to leave were motivated by social 
surveillance and annoyance (such as attention seeking, narcissistic tendencies etc.).  Threats 
to privacy, or surveillance from organisations/institutions did not seem to factor into our 
participants’ reasoning (which was also similar to Baumer et al’s findings).  Notably, our 
findings were limited to anecdotal accounts of people leaving and returning and so did not 
explore the full range of potential reasons participants may have had in doing so. 
Another prominent reason for keeping Facebook was that many participants 
considered their account to be part of their identity or ‘digital history’.  So, aside from a 
mechanism that enables them to keep in touch with their friends, Facebook provides a place 
to reminisce about past events and to keep digital records of their memories.  Again, 
participants holding these perspectives seemed oblivious to the privacy risks associated with 
keeping data in this way.  For instance, recent research in digital hoarding (i.e. the over-
accumulation of emails, photographs and so forth) has highlighted that many people feel 
attached to their digital data, feeling that its value may be realised sometime in the future 
(Sweeten, Sillence, & Neave, 2018).   The sentimental value of digital data has been widely 
reported (Brewer & Jones, 2015; Thomas & Briggs, 2014) as well as the notion that virtual 
possessions become a part of a person’s identity (Belk, 2016).  As such, this can create 
reluctance to delete personal information, especially if people also perceive the task to be 
unnecessary and unrewarding (Dabbish, Kraut, Fussell, & Kiesler, 2005).  Further, this can 
also affect a person’s network, for instance research on shadow profiling has demonstrated 
how personal attributes (such as sexuality and political orientation) can be inferred through 
others’ data (Bagrow, Liu & Mitchell, 2019; Garcia, 2017).  If people are reluctant to delete 
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their information, then not only does this put themselves at risk, but also others within their 
networks too.     
4.2. Limitations  
Our study has numerous limitations.  Whist our sample had a degree of diversity in 
relation to age, level of education and occupation, it is likely that our sample is non-
representative of the general population.  Therefore, we do not know the extent to which our 
findings generalise across different backgrounds and cultures.  Although participants reported 
mixed concerns regarding their privacy on Facebook and in general, none appeared to have 
experienced any data theft or misuse first hand, our findings may have been different if we 
interviewed people who had experienced some kind of privacy intrusion, or indeed had seen 
the kind of behavioural targeting that was employed by Cambridge Analytica.  Further, as our 
interviews were limited to participants’ experiences and self-reports of using Facebook we 
had no measure of their actual behaviour.  Therefore, it could be the case that some of the 
behaviours that they described were different in reality (e.g. they may have claimed to have 
reported abusive behaviour towards others, but instead they did nothing), but unfortunately, 
we had no way of truly assessing this in our interviews. 
4.3. Practical Implications and Recommendations for Future Work 
Our findings highlight numerous insights that could be useful to system designers, 
online communities, cybersecurity practitioners and researchers generally.  Overall, our 
findings showed that people believe that they are resistant to persuasive communications, 
they lack understanding of how targeted advertising works, and do not realise that their 
privacy can be violated through subtle, indirect ways (via their own and others’ data).   
Participants did not consider privacy or targeted advertisements beyond themselves, rather, 
their thinking was limited to their own settings and information disclosure.  This was evident 
in people’s perceptions of targeted advertising, as people described their confusion about how 
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algorithms work and struggled to comprehend how their digital traces may be a factor in this.  
There is a clear need for improving awareness of networked privacy risks and educating 
people on how to protect themselves.  However, researchers and practitioners must be careful 
in order to avoiding contributing to further fatigue/disengagement by overloading people with 
more information they may struggle to understand or keep up with.  Future research could  
therefore explore ways to make this more effective. 
Researchers could also consider how certain features could be designed or improved 
to support people’s abilities to manage how information spreads throughout their networks.   
Our findings conveyed a variety of intricate strategies that individuals use to regulate their 
privacy boundaries with others.  The ‘View As’ and ‘Hide’ buttons appeared to be popular 
mechanisms people use to curate their content in terms of controlling how they appear to 
others.  Similar features could therefore be developed to inform people what organisations or 
institutions can “see” from their digital traces, as a way to inform people to better manage 
their collective privacy.  Further, future research may want to further disentangle people’s 
complex feelings and behaviours related to leaving Facebook.  It seems that for many, the 
need to maintain connections, or the desire to keep memories overrides people’s decisions to 
close their accounts and delete their data. Further work of the ramifications of digital 
hoarding within the context of networked privacy would therefore help us to understand the 
potential security implications of these behaviours.   
The notion of feeling fatigued seemed to underpin many of the concepts present in 
our findings, from updating settings, to paying attention to expert advice, feeling drained by 
others’ behaviour etc.  Further work could seek to establish ways to attempt to motivate 
people to become more engaged and motivated towards understanding their privacy and 
actively managing it.  Similarly, the finding that users will not close their accounts has also 
been present amongst numerous debates about regulating Facebook in terms of imposing 
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laws and rules for how data is used and protected (Casanovas, De Koker, Mendelson, & 
Watts, 2017; Tambini, 2018).  Future research could explore users’ thoughts and behaviours 
surrounding the potential impact of such regulatory regimes.   
Finally, another challenge concerns responsibility - in terms of what a user is responsible 
for, and what organisations/platforms are responsible for.  Existing research has displayed 
mixed perspectives regarding responsibility for privacy in terms of whether it is the 
individual’s or the organisation with whom they are transacting (Vitak, Shilton, & Ashktorab, 
2016).  For instance, Fiesler and Hallinan (2018) found that some people felt victims were to 
blame for their own privacy violations, because they “should have known” or used common 
sense when disclosing or protecting their information, whereas others felt that organisations 
or platforms should be responsible.  Irrespectively, both perspectives are problematic - 
placing responsibility in hands of users creates more pressure to read policies, accept terms 
and conditions, stay up-to-date with changes etc. in a climate in which we know that they are 
already tired and frustrated of these demands (Barnes & Van Dyne, 2009; Choi et al., 2018; 
Keith, Maynes, Lowry, & Babb, 2014).  Likewise, placing responsibility entirely on 
organisations can arouse suspicion of their motives, and decrease individuals’ trust, making 
them feel like they lack control over their data (e.g. Brandimarte et al., 2013; Kokolakis, 
2017).  This is also further complicated when considering aspects such as shadow profiling, 
or how data is shared with third parties beyond the original platform.  Future research could 
therefore explore how to best address and balance these issues.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In sum, our study examined how people understand online privacy, its relationship to 
targeted advertising, and how they manage/avoid different types of such content online.  Our 
aim was to explore whether Cambridge Analytica was at the forefront of people’s minds 
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during this time.  By conducting an inductive thematic analysis, our findings highlighted a 
number of key insights regarding how people feel about psychologically tailored 
advertisements, and their understanding of how algorithms may use their online data.  
Overall, most people were aware of the Cambridge Analytica scandal and its supposed 
attempts to influence people’s political preferences.  However, they lacked understanding of 
how people’s data were collected and used in such settings, and that their personal 
information could be inferred from others within their networks. Despite expressing concern 
over how organisations may use their data in future, all participants believed they would be 
immune to any attempts to persuade/influence their behaviour.  Future research could further 
examine these concepts and attempt to establish new ways to encourage users to more 
actively protect themselves online.   
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